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The Sustainability and Future of Unrecognized Quasi-
States  
  
Scattered around the world are a number of states and statelets that have declared 
independence but are not recognized by other states. These political entities are 
referred to by various names, 'de facto states', 'unrecognized states', 'pseudo-states' 
and 'quasi-states'. Since their existence is not supported by international recognition, 
they must be sustained by something else. In contrast to researchers who maintain that 
the majority of these quasi-states are quite strong, this article argues that their modal 
tendency is weak economy and weak state structures. The main reasons why these 
states nevertheless have not collapsed seem to be that they have managed to build up 
internal support from the local population through propaganda and identity-building; 
channel a disproportionately large part of their meager resources into military 
defense; enjoy the support of a strong patron; and in most cases have seceded from a  
state that is itself very weak.  
 
None of these circumstances, however, is likely to secure the unrecognized quasi-
states lasting life. Unless they achieve international recognition or are united with 
their patron state—both of which in most cases are unlikely outcomes—they will 
eventually be reabsorbed into the parent state, or agree to an autonomous status  
within the parent state in a federal arrangement. This last outcome is the preferred 
option of the IC.  
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There are quasi-states and quasi-states  
The international system is made up of (nation)-states. Territorial-political entities 
such as colonies, protectorates, mandates, and other kinds of overseas territories that 
covered so much of the earth in earlier centuries, have for all practical purposes 
disappeared. Contemporary nation-states enjoy double sovereignty: internally, vis-à-
vis their own citizens, and externally, vis-à-vis other states. Internally, state 
authorities have a monopoly on collecting taxes from the inhabitants of the country, 
and in return provide basic services to the population such as welfare and security; 
externally, they are recognized as the sole representative of the nation in international 
fora. 
 
However, also two types of territorial-political entities do not fit this basic description 
of the nation-state in today's world. Some would-be states lack internal sovereignty: in 
these cases the state authorities, while internationally recognized as the sole 
representative of the state, nevertheless fail to fulfill the basic tasks required of them 
with regard to provision of services to and protection of their citizens. In other cases, 
the state as such is not accepted by the international community as legitimate. This 
denial is not based on any assessment of their internal sovereignty, which may or may 
not be deficient. The reason instead is that the would-be state has seceded from a 
recognized state that does not accept this loss of territory. Such secessionist states can 
be said to lack external sovereignty.  
 
It is immediately clear that in important respects these two deviations from the normal 
nation-state model are very different, indeed, diametrically opposite. Even so, these 
two phenomena are often described with the same appellation: Quasi-states. Such 
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terminological confusion is clearly undesirable and ought to be eliminated. In this 
article, however, I will make use of the terminological coincidence to highlight the 
particularity of unrecognized quasi-states by pointing out the similarities and 
differences with the other type of quasi-states. 
 
For quasi-states without internal sovereignty international recognition is enough to 
survive. The sanctions against encroachment on the territorial integrity of all 
recognized states are so powerful that even the weakest are guaranteed a continued 
life. In the anarchic international system states play hardball for power and influence 
but they do not try to eliminate each other. Iraq's botched attempt to gobble up Kuwait 
in 1990 is just the example that proves the rule.  
 
But this begs the question: if international recognition is the magic trick that keeps 
weak states from sinking into non-existence in the modern world, how can 
unrecognized quasi-states exist without it? As we shall see, the answer cannot be state 
strength since many of these unrecognized quasi-states are in fact quite weak by any 
standard. Even so, they are not only still with us, but their numbers have in fact 
proliferated over the last decades.  
 
Quasi-states as states with external sovereignty only 
In his seminal book Quasi-states: Sovereignty, International Relations and the Third 
World  Robert H. Jackson pointed out that most European colonies in Africa that 
achieved independence in the 1950s and 1960s were ill prepared for sovereign 
statehood (Jackson, 1993). They had been ruled like British counties or French 
départements, and lacked even the most basic infrastructure of government. They had 
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no elites with sufficient professional training and social responsibility to take over the 
reins of the state.  
 
In the past states were created through war and diplomacy, and states that could not 
fend for themselves disintegrated and disappeared from the map. The postcolonial 
states, however, continue to exist even in the absence of the basic qualities that in the 
past were deemed indispensable for statehood. The post-Word-War II state system 
extends recognition to states on a purely formal basis. The result has been the 
emergence of a qualitatively new type of state: the quasi-state, Jackson claimed. 
Quasi-states are kept from collapsing by leaning on an external scaffolding of 
international recognition, not by any internal structure of institutions and laws. Being 
protected by international law against external intrusions, quasi-states possess only 
external or negative sovereignty.  
 
State leaders in quasi-states often receive the bulk of their revenues not from the 
taxing of their own population but from international donors and through the 
exploitation of the country’s exportable natural resources. Most of the money finds its 
way into the pockets of the power holders, and is not invested in projects to strengthen 
the state or improve conditions for the population. The relationship of the ‘state’ to its 
population is therefore extremely tenuous. The leaders of the quasi-state do not 
depend on support from below in order to survive in office. Instead, competing elites 
vie with each other for control of the ‘state’ — or rather for the right to present 
themselves abroad as the representatives of this virtually non-existent entity, since this 
badge carries with it the possibility of manipulating external donors and extracting 
internal resources.  
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Jackson’s book triggered a wide debate on the nature of post-colonial states. He has 
been criticized for tarring all third world countries with the same brush (see e.g. 
Haynes 1994) and clearly, there are vast differences in state capacity and state 
structure between, say, Liberia and Botswana. Even so, Jackson alerted us to an 
important and serious problem in international relations. While his book was highly 
influential, however, his key terminology nevertheless failed to establish itself. It is 
still being used in specialized academic literature, but in journalism and political 
jargon other terms are used to describe the same or virtually the same phenomena as 
what Jackson referred to as quasi-states. Most commonly used is 'failed states'1 while 
some authors write about 'weak states' and 'shadow states' to describe states that lack 
internal sovereignty (e.g. Beissinger and Young, 2002). 
 
At the same time, we can note that the term 'quasi-state' is increasingly used about the 
opposite phenomenon of less-than-real statehood: about states that lack international 
recognition. Gail Lapidus, for instance, writes that politically and militarily frozen 
conflicts in post-Soviet Eurasia 'have resulted in the creation of several quasi-states 
[that have] de facto control over their own territory but are unlikely to be recognized 
by the international community’ (Lapidus, 2002). Numerous other examples of a 
similar use of the term could be cited (Baev 1998; Holmes, 2001; Bridge, 2004; 
Cornell, 2003). 
 
To be sure, 'quasi-states' is not the only term used about states that wish for but are 
denied a seat in the UN General Assembly. Scott Pegg and Dov Lynch prefer the term 
de jure state, while Charles King calls them ‘unrecognized states’ (Pegg, 1998; 
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Lynch, 2002; King, 2001).2 Both of these terms highlight important qualities of these 
'almost-states'.3 When I in this article nevertheless stick to the term 'quasi-states' it is 
in order to underscore the similarities between the two types of quasi-states, those 
lacking internal sovereignty and those lacking international recognition. Both 
categories are located at the margins of the international system of states and 
challenge basic assumptions of this system. Furthermore, they are quite often found 
on the same territory and relate to each other as cause and effect: A Jacksonian-type 
quasi-state is often too weak to control effectively all of its territory, and this makes it 
possible for political elites on the periphery to break away from state authority and 
proclaim their region an independent, but unrecognized state. Entities of both kinds 
tend to be hot-spots in international politics: they are products of warfare as well as 
causes for new armed conflicts. And finally, there are strong reasons to believe that if 
any of the unrecognized quasi-states of today's world should succeed in achieving 
international recognition most of them will end up not as 'normal' or full-fledged 
states but instead transmute into recognized quasi-states of the Jacksonian variety. 
 
Below, the term 'quasi-states' will be reserved for states that have proclaimed 
independence but lack international recognition. Whenever there is a need to refer to 
quasi-states of the opposite kind, they will be labeled ‘Jacksonian quasi-states' or 
'failed states.' 
 
Quasi-States—a brief survey 
Unrecognized quasi-states are found on several continents—Europe, Africa, and 
Asia—but they are not evenly distributed over the surface of the globe. After the end 
of the Cold War there has clearly been a higher than average incidence of such 
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entities in the former Soviet Union and in the former Yugoslavia — that is, in two 
recently disintegrated multinational communist federations. In the former Soviet 
republic of Moldova we find the Dniester Moldovan Republic (DMR); in southern 
Russia, Chechnya; and in Azerbaijan, the Nagorno-Karabakh Republic. Georgia has 
the dubious distinction of being the home of two quasi-states: Abkhazia and South 
Ossetia.  
 
In former Yugoslavia, Kosovo in many respects approaches the status of a quasi-state. 
Republika Srpska in Bosnia had that status until it was recognized as an entity within 
Bosnia-Herzegovina after the signing of the Dayton agreement in 1995. In the same 
year also another entity could be removed from the inventory of quasi-states in the 
former Yugoslavia when Republika Srpska Krajina in eastern Croatia was overrun by 
Croatian forces under Operation Storm.  
 
On the border between Europe and Asia there is, in addition to Chechnya, also the 
Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC). Between the first and the second Gulf 
War the Kurdish-controlled areas in Northern Iraq basically conformed to a quasi-
state status. Africa has had at least four quasi-states since decolonization, one of 
which (Eritrea) has achieved international recognition, while two (Katanga and 
Biafra) have been eliminated, and one (Somaliland) continues as an unrecognized 
entity. In Sri Lanka we find another such state, Tamil Eelam, proclaimed by the LTTE 
(The 'Tamil Tigers') in 1977. Taiwan, recognized by twenty-eight countries, can be 
said to be in a category of its own and occupy an intermediate position between a 
recognized state and a quasi-state. 
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As this list of defunct and extant quasi-states shows, these entities lead a highly 
precarious existence. They come and go, but some have displayed considerable 
staying power — the oldest among them today, the TRNC, was established in 1974, 
and has thus existed continuously for an entire generation. Of the quasi-states 
established on the territory of the former Soviet Union after the fall of communism, 
all except Chechnya continue to muddle through.  
 
Considering the strong bias against quasi-states in the international state system, what 
we need to explain is not so much the reasons for the demise of some of these states—
which is the expected outcome—but the tenacious persistence of some of them.  
 
Previous research 
Little attention has been paid to unrecognized quasi-states. My attempt to find 
theoretical or comparative literature on these unruly political creatures yielded a 
meager catch. Only one monograph and a smattering of specialized articles deal with 
unrecognized quasi-states in a comparative or theoretical perspective. Among them, 
Scott Pegg in his otherwise quite comprehensive study International Society and the 
de Facto State (1998) virtually ignores the post-Soviet space, while articles by 
Vladimir Kolossov and John O'Loughlin, Charles King and Dov Lynch focus almost 
exclusively on quasi-states in the post-Soviet space. This geographical difference in 
their scholarly attention often lead them towards diverging conclusions, but on one 
crucial point all but one of them agree: Unrecognized quasi-states are remarkably 
robust, state-like entities.  
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Scott Pegg argues that 'A de facto state (= unrecognized quasi-state) requires some 
sort of viable, organized, functioning governing entity. The mere fact that a sovereign 
state's control does not run throughout its entire country should in no way be 
interpreted as indicating the presence of a de facto state' (Pegg, 1998,  p. 28). Even so, 
in his overview of potential de facto states Pegg includes, with some reservations, 
virtually all of the quasi-states listed above.  
 
Charles King for his part regards most of the quasi-states on the territory of the former 
Soviet Union as 'surprisingly strong'. 'The territorial separatists of the 1990s have 
become state builders in the early 2000s, creating de facto countries whose ability to 
field armies, control their own territory, educate their children, and maintain local 
economies is about as well developed as that of the recognized states of which they 
are still notionally a part’ (King,  2001, p. 525). This ability of post-Soviet ethnic 
separatists to build reasonably well-functioning states King sees at a crucial reason 
behind their survival.  
 
In contrast to these views Dov Lynch sees the de facto states as failing. 'They have the 
institutional fixtures of statehood, but they are not able to provide for its substance' 
(Lynch, 2002, p. 841). Charles Fairbanks shares this view and expresses the failure of 
quasi-states in ever stronger terms as 'the weakest of weak' (Fairbanks, 2002, p. 141). 
 
Evaluations of strength and weakness are inevitably relative and the concepts of ‘state 
strength and ‘state weakness’ must be defined in order to be operationalized. A 
working definition of strong states is provided by Ghia Nodia as ‘states that are 
capable of carrying out functions that they themselves claim and that they are 
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reasonably expected by their populations to carry out’ (Nodia, 2002, p. 415). Building 
on Nodia’s definition Crawford Young defines the opposite phenomenon of a ‘weak 
state’ as a state that ‘meets minimum Weberian definitions of institutions of rule and 
is able to carry out some basic functions but is far from performing according to 
domestic and international expectations of a “normal” state’ (Young, 2002, p. 446). 
 
Basing myself on these definitions, I agree with Lynch against Pegg, King, and 
Kolossov & O'Loughlin. I will argue that the modal tendency of quasi-states is 
deficient state-building. Furthermore, as I explain below, there are strong structural 
reasons why this should be the case. Perhaps only a few quasi-states may be counted 
among 'the weakest of the weak', as Fairbanks calls them, but in hardly any of them is 
it successful state-building that keeps them from collapsing. This means that we must 
looks elsewhere for an answer to my initial question: what is it that sustains quasi-
states? 
 
Undermining Sustainability by Deficient State-Building and a Criminalized 
Economy 
A few quasi-states operate reasonably well. Apart from the extreme success story of 
Taiwan, which is an anomalous case, we have for instance the relatively well-
functioning Turkic Republic on Northern Cyprus. But also TRNC has serious 
economic problems, and  Greek Cypriots have a per capita income that is three to four 
times as high as that of the citizens of TRNC.  
 
Some quasi-states have been given  rather conflicting assessments. Somaliland has 
been characterized both  as a 'comparatively strong democratic credentials and 
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functional effectiveness' (Pegg, 1998,  p. 11), and 'a pirate state based on criminal-
terrorist activities' (Kolossov and O’Loughlin, 1999, p. 155). Also with regard to 
DMR opinions vary widely. Vladimir Kolossov and John O’Loughlin claim that 
'Eight years after the declaration of sovereignty, [DMR] has all the attributes of a 
normal state, except for international recognition. These include a constitution 
adopted by referendum, an elected parliament and president, formal government, a 
system of security (police, an army of 5,000 to 7,000 men, and customs services), a 
system of elected local administration, and a (weak) currency’ (Kolossov and 
O’Loughlin, 1999, p. 167). Other observers, however, point out that the Dniester 
republic has a  thoroughly criminalized economy, based on smuggling and fake brand 
industry. The republic has also been accused of being a free haven for fugitive 
gangsters and former KGB officials in hiding (see King, 2001; Duplain, 1994, 13).  
 
State weakness may be the result of deficient capabilities or deficient will. The 
economic resources of most quasi-states are clearly small. Kosovo was the poorest 
region in Tito’s Yugoslavia, and Chechnya, Nagorno-Karabakh, and South Ossetia 
were all very backward regions in the Soviet Union. The situation of Abkhazia and 
the DMR is different. In the Soviet period, both of these regions fared better than 
most other parts of their respective parent republics, Georgia and Moldova. Srpska 
Krajina occupied an intermediate position: It included both very backward regions, in 
Krajina proper, as well as some rather well-to-do, oil-rich regions in eastern Slavonia. 
In Africa, Biafra was a resource-rich region that failed to establish itself as an 
independent state—in spite of substantial Western sympathy—while poverty-stricken 
and unknown Somaliland still has not been reunited with its challenger state, Somalia.  
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At the same time, state weakness is often a result of policy rather than fate. Leaders of 
Jacksonian-type quasi-states lack incentives for effective state-building since they can 
achieve power as well as personal wealth without it. William Reno claims that, in 
extreme cases, leaders of failed states—or ‘shadow states,’ as he calls them—may 
have a positive incentive to destroy remaining formal institutions. 'Rulers who do not 
offer postal services jealously guard the unfulfilled prerogatives of state sovereignty' 
(Reno, 2002, p. 110). 
 
Most unrecognized quasi-states have certainly not stooped to the level of shadow 
states, but some like Chechnya, come unnervingly close. Valery Tishkov describes 
Chechnya between the first and the second Chechen Wars as a society on the brink of 
complete anarchy. The state institutions were pure fiction, communications were 
erratic at best, schools were closed, stores empty, and production had ground to a halt. 
The only thriving businesses were smuggling, looting, and hostage taking. People 
were killed for a trifle, or for no reason at all, and there was no-one to deter the 
perpetrators. The warlords knew no solidarity, not even towards their own clan 
(Tishkov, 2004). 
 
Chechnya may be an extreme case and Tishkov's picture may be painted in 
excessively dark colors. Even so, reports from other quasi-states are often almost as 
bleak. In Abkhazia, Dov Lynch reports, the government 'maintains the daily 
operations of legislative, executive and judicial institutions, but performs very few 
services for the population…. Moreover the state is unable to provide for law and 
order across its claimed territory' (Lynch,  2002, 836). In NKR the inhabitants eke out 
a living by smuggling, drug traffic, and selling timber to Iran and other countries. 
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Living conditions in South Ossetia are just as bad, if not worse. Kosovo has been 
characterized as a place with ‘no rule of law, no ethnic tolerance, no human rights. 
Not even an economy, except foreign aid and organized crime’ Pascali, 2001). 
 
 There are several reasons why quasi-states fail to develop well-ordered economies. 
One is war damage. Secession has normally been won through a civil war that was 
fought mostly or entirely on the territory of the quasi-state. The length and ferocity of 
these wars have varied, but often they led to the destruction of entire villages and even 
towns. Another reason is what Scott Pegg has called 'the economic cost of non-
recognition' (Pegg, 1998, 43). Foreign firms are wary of investing in a quasi-state 
since legal contracts might not be internationally binding there. Investors may also be 
afraid of offending the parent state, lest they be barred from trade with its normally 
larger market. In some cases—Cyprus is a case in point—the parent state has also 
been able to impose a successful international embargo on the secessionist territory.  
 
While a status as quasi-states puts a damper on normal legal trade with the outside 
world it encourages illegal business. As already indicated, virtually all quasi-states 
have a large shadow economy, often with intimate links to top state leaders. Local 
officials and authorities profit from this business through cuts and kickbacks, but the 
quasi-state as such derives no benefit from it. The ‘revenue’ collected in this way goes 
into private pockets and not to the state exchequer. While this phenomenon is of 
course well known from other countries, and in the Western world as well, certain 
circumstances conspire to aggravate the problem in quasi-states. One is the civil war 
which in most cases preceded the establishment of the quasi-state. In times of war, not 
only buildings are destroyed, but also civil and legal structures are disrupted and 
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illegal activities easily go unchecked. As Espen Barth Eide has remarked with regard 
to Kosovo, 'While wars, blockades and exceptional situations are devastating for the 
majority, they create breeding ground for certain types of economic activity that 
proves particularly effective in the absence of order. The people that benefit from 
such activities see few reasons to support the re-establishment of effective public 
control' (Eide, 1999). 
 
If the war experience were the only problem, it would conceivably be gradually 
diminished after peace, but also certain qualities inherent in quasi-states are conducive 
to a criminalization of the economy, irrespective of the war factor. Since these states 
are not recognized, no international conventions can be applied, and no effective 
monitoring by international organizations is possible. The resulting lack of 
transparency in these states is extremely attractive for criminal and other shady 
businesses. As Thomas de Waal has argued with regard to the quasi-state he has 
studied, ‘… internationally, Nagorny Karabakh remained as much an outlaw as 
Chechnya. None of its laws or institutions were valid outside its own borders, and no 
foreign diplomats, apart from peace negotiators, set foot there. That was virtually an 
invitation to become a rogue state’ (de Waal, 2003, p. 246; see also Cornell, 2003, 
218). 
 
 
Circumstances sustaining quasi-states  
Most quasi-states then, lack not only international recognition both also strong state 
structures, and still they exist. At least five factors can be identified that contribute to 
the viability of unrecognized quasi-states: Symbolic nation-building; militarization of 
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society; the weakness of the parent state; support from an external patron; and lack of 
involvement on the part of the international community. The sections below present 
these factors separately and then discuss how alterations in the character and the 
relative weight of each of them may lead to different ends to quasi-states. 
 
NATION-BUILDING 
A distinction can be made between state-building and nation-building. State-building 
as discussed above pertains to the institutional, economic, and military groundwork of 
functional states, the ‘hard’ aspects of state construction, as it were. Nation-building, 
on the other hand, concerns the ‘soft’ aspects of state consolidation, such as the 
development of a common national identity among the inhabitants through symbols, 
propaganda, history writing and the cultivation and 'invention' of traditions and 
national customs. 'Nationhood' and 'national identity' are not inherent qualities of a 
state's population, but is developed and sustained through nation-building. 
 
All nations in today’s world are proclaimed as nation-states. Rightly or wrongly, state 
leaders invariably claim to represent their ‘nation’. In a similar way the leaders of 
quasi-states speak on behalf of the Ossetian people, the Somaliland people, the people 
of Dniestria, and so on. Like other states, they strenuously try to foster a sense of 
common identity and destiny among the inhabitants of the territory they control. 
Through nation-building the quasi-state leaders seek to muster backing from within, 
from the local population, to create or prop up its internal sovereignty.  
 
Normally, successful nation-building to a large degree depends upon successful state-
building. Through nation-building, the state authorities are, as it were, asking the 
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population to attach their allegiance to this particular state by identifying with it. 
Before the citizens decide to do so, they are prone to ask, 'What do I get in return? ' 
The standard answer to that question is 'security and welfare services'. A state that 
cannot deliver the basic services expected of it will find it much harder to win the 
loyalty of its denizens than a state that can. Even so, I will argue that even in the 
absence of effective state-building most quasi-states have succeeded reasonably well 
in their nation-building efforts. The available evidence suggests that the population of 
most quasi-states share a high degree of common identity as a nation. There are 
mainly three reasons for this.  
 
Firstly, quasi-state nation-builders can draw upon the memory of the civil war through 
which the quasi-state was established. The fact that all quasi-states—by continuing to 
exist—can    claim to have won the civil war increases the possibilities of exploiting 
war memories for nation-building purposes. This is done in many different ways. War 
memorials are constructed and Days of victory and Days of mourning are instituted. 
DMR has published a number of booklets and brochures on the 1992 war, including a 
memorial book with pictures and names of all 457 Dniestrians who died (Kniga 
pamiati, 1995). Nagorno-Karabakh and other quasi-states have instituted a series of 
medals and orders for valor and service to the Fatherland. Some of the medals have 
been awarded posthumously to martyred soldiers (Orders and Medals, 2005). 
 
Secondly, quasi-states authorities can cultivate the image of the Common External 
Enemy. Even if the civil war is a thing of the past, the challenger state—the parent 
state—continues to exist and to claim jurisdiction over the breakaway region. Like 
other states, many quasi-states are riven by strong regional, ideological, and other 
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divisions but the image of the Common External Enemy serves as a powerful motor 
for national unification. In this way the challenger states in spite of themselves 
contribute to the consolidation of nations they deny the existence of.4  
 
Finally, the population of the quasi-state has been homogenized through population 
exchanges and ethnic cleansing that preceded or accompanied the secession. The part 
of the population that sympathized with the parent state for ideological reasons or 
identified with it on ethnic grounds has in many cases been induced to flee, often with 
quite coercive methods. Conversely, many supporters of the secessionist cause who 
formerly lived outside the breakaway region, will have taken up residence in the 
unrecognized quasi-state. Also this reverse population movement is often the result of 
forced expulsions. In this way Nagorno-Karabakh was cleansed of virtually its entire 
Azeri population in 1988-91, while ethnic Armenians living in other parts of 
Azerbaijan fled to Armenia en masse. Prior to  the 1974 war Turkish-Cypriots had 
been living scattered around the entire island of Cyprus, while the territory of what is 
now TRNC had a Greek-Cypriot majority. The present population pattern, then, with 
a virtually 100 percent Turkish-populated Northern Cyprus, has been achieved 
through fear-induced flights in both directions.  
 
In 1989 ethnic Georgians made up 45 percent of Abkhazia's population  while ethnic 
Abkhazians constituted only 18 percent, but during the 1993 war most ethnic 
Georgians fled to Georgia proper. This was not an accidental side-effect of the 
hostilities, but the result of a deliberate policy to undo the consequences of what the 
Abkhazian leaders see as an intentional change in the ethnic structure of Abkhazia in 
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the Soviet period: in the early 20th century ethnic Abkhazians had constituted a 
majority population in Abkhazia, and this situation they were determined to recreate. 
 
In some instances, with DMR as the best example, a separate identity for the 
population of the rebellious region has been achieved without any ethnic cleansing. 
Ethnic Moldovans make up roughly 40 percent of DMR’s population, and  while 
many of them sympathize with the Chisinau regime quite a few clearly share in the 
common supraethnic Dniester identity fostered by the Tiraspol leadership. This 
identity is based not on ethnicity, but on a common language--Russian, a separate 
history, and a certain Soviet nostalgia (Kolstø and Andrei Malgin, 1998). 
 
All quasi-states have adopted a state flag, a national anthem, a state coat of arms, new 
national holidays, and other symbolic attributes of statehood. They also build 
museums, erect statues, rename streets, and frequently create a cult of personality 
around their leader in order to inculcate in the population a sense of common past and 
common allegiance to the same state (Troebst, 2003). All states, both old and new, 
engage in such symbolic nation-building, but for newly established states—quasi-
states as well as recognized states—such endeavors are particularly important. The 
more tenuous the claim to separate nationhood, the more effort and ingenuity the state 
authorities need to employ to convince the population of its reality (Kolstø, 2000). 
 
There are no objective criteria by which one may assess to what degree the nation-
building of quasi-states is a success or failure. Many quasi-states have an authoritarian 
regime in which election results must be treated with great care as indicators of 
popular attitudes. Through various methods, however, popular support for the quasi-
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state's statehood may nevertheless be gauged. An opinion poll in DMR in 1998 
showed that residents in the Tiraspol-controlled region of Moldova did indeed 
dissociate themselves from the Moldovan nation-building project and to a large 
degree identified with the DMR state (Kolstø, 2002, pp.  31-70). Such data, however, 
will always be subject to interpretation and those who dispute them may claim that the 
respondents have been coerced by local authorities or manipulated by secessionist 
propaganda. (I note, however, that if people support the state as a result of propaganda 
this simply means that nation-building efforts are bearing fruit—that the propaganda 
is effective.) 
 
MILITARY POWER 
'Soft power' in the shape of internal support from the population, however, is not 
enough to secure quasi-states continued existence. The quasi-state was created by 
military means and must be maintained by the same means. As political entities that 
are not protected by the international system of mutual recognition they are thrown 
back into the Hobbesian jungle and more than other states they must rely on brute 
force in order to survive. Their armed forces, however, do not have to be very large. 
Charles King has estimated the armed forces of the quasi-states of the former Soviet 
Union to be 15,000 to 20,000 thousand in Nagorno-Karabakh, 5,000 to 10,000 in 
DMR; 2,000 in South Ossetia, and 5,000 in Abkhazia (King, 2001, 535) Compared to 
the size of the national army in most states, it is not very much, but relative to the size 
of the total population in the statelet this is considerable.  
 
For the quasi-states the need for a strong military capability means that they must 
devote a disproportionately large part of the resources of the state to defense purposes. 
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This leaves fewer resources to civilian purposes, and contributes to the weak 
development of welfare, educational facilities, and the building of infrastructure in the 
quasi-states. Even if the authorities in quasi-states should have the will to develop 
strong civilian state structures—and as argued above in many cases there is reason to 
suspect that this will is quite weak—they would normally not have the capacity for it.  
 
The crucial role of the armed forces for the survival of the quasi-states further leads to 
a militarization of society. The constant reminder of the civil war underscores the vital 
role of the armed forces for the survival of the country, and props up the prestige and 
influence of the military establishment in the statelet. In many quasi-states military 
leaders have also been able to transform this influence into political and economic 
power. In Kosovo former KLA officers today control shady business structures as 
well as local political bodies (Pascali, 2001). Another example is PMR. For many 
years the strongman of PMR was the interior minister Vadim Shevtsov, alias 
Antiuf'ev, a former KGB general who is wanted in Latvia for his activities during 
Latvia’s liberation struggle (Bowers, 1994, p. 562). In NKR a certain Samvel 
Babayan made a name for himself during the war with Azerbaijan and was 
skyrocketed into the position of Minister of Defense. That position he used to line his 
pockets and terrorize the local population until he fell out with the president of the 
quasi-state and was arrested in March 2000 (de Waal, 2003, pp. 241-43). 
 
THE WEAKNESS OF THE PARENT STATE 
Military strength and military weakness are of course relative measures. It is enough 
for the quasi-state to be sufficiently strong to keep at bay the parent state from which 
it has seceded. And in fact, the parent state of most quasi-states is a weak state, in 
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political and institutional as well as in military terms. This is the most important 
reason why we find a particularly high concentration of unrecognized quasi-states in 
the former Soviet Union and  former Yugoslavia. At the time when they were 
established amid the ruins of these two communist federations  they were extremely 
weak, in the grips of a painful political and economic transition. This created a 
window of opportunity which secessionist groups in several states availed themselves 
of.  
 
Georgia, Azerbaijan, and Moldova were not only economically and politically weak 
in the first years after independence, but also riven by severe internal conflicts. 
Moldovans were deeply divided on the issue of unification with Romania, while 
Azerbaijan went through several coup d'etats and regime changes before Geidar Aliev 
managed to install himself, and later his son, in power. Georgia fared worst of all, as 
the country in 1992 descended into a civil war in which Georgians confronted 
Georgians, a war that ran partly parallel with the military campaigns against the 
separatists. In the early to mid-1990s Georgia clearly qualified as 'failed state' (Nodia, 
2002).  
 
To be sure, not all Soviet successor states were equally weak. The largest by far, 
Russia, was clearly in a much better position to defend its territory, although the 
economic transition hit also this country hard. Russia could take over the organs of 
administration of the central Soviet state, as well as the lion's share of the former 
Soviet Army units and their equipment. Still, even Russia has not been able to 
establish full control over all parts of its breakaway region, Chechnya.  
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The weakness of the parent state was a major factor behind also the establishment of 
African quasi-states. Like the Soviet quasi-states, Katanga was proclaimed when its 
parent state, Congo, had just been established. The former colonial power, Belgium, 
was notorious for its failure to build up any infrastructure or state apparatus,  or to 
provide for the  education of an indigenous elite capable of taking over after 
independence. The two parent states on Africa's Horn are likewise extremely weak. 
Somalia was and still is a paradigmatic case of a failed state, with no functioning state 
authorities, while  Ethiopia in 1991was defeated on the battlefield by the Eritrean 
separatists.  
 
As long as the parent state is mired in political chaos and economic misery it is not 
only prevented from launching a new war to recapture the lost territory but also fails 
to attract the population of the breakaway region. Even those citizens of the quasi-
state  who are thoroughly disgusted with their self-proclaimed leaders have few 
reasons to wish for reunification with a  scruffy parent state.  
 
EXTERNAL PATRON 
However, not all parent states are as weak as the ones described above. Some quasi-
states must defend themselves against states with a well-functioning state apparatus, a 
solid economy, and good defense capabilities. Most quasi-states, even those that face 
weak parent states, are therefore dependent upon support from an external patron. 
Such a patron may be said to fulfill the same role as the international community does 
vis-à-vis recognized Jacksonian quasi-states or failed states. In such cases the role of 
the international society as guarantor of continued existence for weak states has been 
privatized, as it were.  
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With a powerful patron, a quasi-state may be able to hold out even against a relatively 
strong challenger state. Taiwan is a strong state for its size, not only economically, but 
also militarily. Like most other quasi-states Taiwan, or Formosa, was established 
when the parent state, the People’s Republic of China, was weak, torn apart by a 
protracted civil war. Today, however,  China is a formidable military power that could 
(and no doubt would) overrun Taiwan were it not for Taiwan’s external patron, the 
United States. 
 
The Dniester Republic, Ossetia, and Abkhazia enjoy the support of Russia while 
Northern Cyprus has another powerful patron, Turkey. In the post-Soviet cases, this 
patronage is unofficial: Russia has not recognized any of its client states, but without 
the involvement of the Russian Fourteenth Army in the Moldovan civil war in 1992, 
the Dniester statelet would most probably have disappeared from the map (Neukirch, 
2002). Also in the wars in South Ossetia and Abkhazia the Russian military played a 
crucial role. In the case of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus the patronage has 
been quite open and explicit: Turkey has, as the only country in the world, extended 
official recognition to its Cypriot daughter republic and also supplies most of its 
military defense.  
 
A major reason why Republika Srpska Krajina and Republika Srpska in Bosnia 
managed to break away from Croatia and Bosnia, respectively, was surreptitious 
military support from the Yugoslav army and Serbian authorities. Armenia, the patron 
state of Nagorno-Karabakh, is itself a weak state with a tottering economy. Even so, it 
is the life-line to Armenia that keeps Nagorno-Karabakh ticking. A clear illustration 
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of the intimate links between the two states is the fact that the current president of 
Armenia, Robert Kocharian, hails from Nagorno-Karabakh and has previously been 
its president. Every year Armenia provides NKR with an interstate loan that covers 
75-80 percent of its budget (Lynch, 2002, 847). Nonetheless, Armenia has not 
officially recognized the political independence of Nagorno-Karabakh. 
 
Some observers surmise that the quasi-states serve as political instruments which the 
patron states use to put pressure on the parent states and generally to project power 
into the region. No doubt patron states often do have such designs, but experience has 
time and again shown that most quasi-states are not pliant clients doing their master's 
bidding. The leadership of DMR, for instance, openly supported the political enemies 
of president Yeltsin during the 1993 power struggle in Moscow (Socor, 1993). Quasi-
states have agendas of their own and have occasionally even been able to wag the 
dog, as when NKR in 1998 was instrumental in toppling president Levon Ter-
Petrossian in Armenia, whom they regarded as too accommodating towards 
Azerbaijani demands (de Waal, 2003, pp. 256-61). Even so, for most quasi-states the 
support from an external patron is  crucially important and their survival chances 
would be drastically reduced should it be withdrawn.  
  
THE ROLE OF THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY 
The international community, (IC) has played several roles in the conflicts between 
quasi-states and their parent states. By denying the quasi-states entrance into the 
international state system it has frustrated their aspirations to graduate into 'real' 
statehood. At the same time,  the IC in a few instances has functioned as a collective 
external patron of a quasi-state. Finally, it has engaged in negotiations and 
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peacekeeping missions in quasi-state conflicts. While the IC as such is clearly in favor 
of peaceful, negotiated settlements to these conflicts, it seems fair to conclude that its 
involvement in most instances has had a quite different effect, and inadvertently 
contributed to the prolonged existence of the quasi-states.  
 
The two cases where the IC may be said to have functioned as the  external patron of 
a quasi-state are Kosovo and the Kurdish-controlled territories in Northern Iraq 
between the first and second Gulf wars. The degree of active involvement in these 
cases differs. In Northern Iraq it was a matter of denying the parent state the 
possibility of recapturing control of the area while leaving administration in the hands 
of the local population. In Kosovo, by contrast, the United Nations and NATO 
through KFOR and UNMIK have virtually taken over the military defense as well as 
direct oversight of the civilian administration. Kosovo is today for all practical 
purposes run as an international protectorate.  
 
More commonly, the IC has engaged in quasi-state conflicts by offering its good 
services as facilitator and arbiter at the negotiating table. Typical cases are the OCSE-
sponsored negotiations in the DMR conflict, the so-called Minsk process to resolve 
the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict—also OCSE-sponsored, and the UN-facilitated 
negotiations for Cyprus. Sometimes such negotiation efforts have been accompanied 
by a deployment of peace-keeping forces.  
 
The problem with the involvement of the IC in quasi-state conflicts is the indecision 
and inconsistency it has been pursued with. The lack of  vigor and determination in 
these  efforts clearly reflects the low priority these conflicts have in Western capitals. 
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This has made it possible for regional actors with a stronger interest in the conflict to 
interfere in the process and pursue their own agendas. This happened for instance 
when Russia—a member of the Minsk group—in 1994 launched its own parallel 
initiative in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, highjacked the negotiations, and imposed 
a lasting ceasefire—but no peace—on its own terms (de Waal, 2003, pp. 237-40; 
Baev, 1998). 
 
Rather than resolve conflicts stalled negotiations freeze them and perpetuate status 
quo. In this way, they contribute to the prolonged existence of the quasi-states. The 
same may be said about most peace-keeping missions. The party most likely to renew 
hostilities in these conflicts is the parent state since it wants to regain lost territory, 
while the unrecognized quasi-state is normally satisfied with holding on the territory it 
has control over. For these reasons, the international peace-keepers deployed between 
the warring parties for all practical purposes function as additional border guard units 
for the quasi-state, behind which it may pursue its nation-building and other activities.  
 
 
Possible ends to quasi-states 
The combination of factors identified in the article—nation-building, military power, 
the weakness of the parent state, support from an external patron, and the tepid 
engagement of the IC—have secured some quasi-states an impressive longevity. Even 
so, they are regarded as essentially transient phenomena, and it is generally expected 
that they will sooner or later disappear as such. Theoretically, this may happen in one 
of four ways: they may be included into the external patron state; be reabsorbed into 
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the parent state; unite with the parent state in a federal arrangement; or achieve 
international recognition as an independent state.  
 
The likelihood that one or another of the four outcomes will come to pass will 
increase or decrease with changes in the political climate and also to a large extent 
depends upon shifts and developments in the factors that now sustain the quasi-states. 
Thus, for instance, a quasi-state may increase its chances for achieving political 
recognition if it manages to build strong state structures and liquidate the most blatant 
criminal activities on its territory. Conversely, a parent state may be able to reabsorb 
the secessionist territory by force if it manages to muster a strong army, or by  
peaceful means if it succeeds in building effective state structures and a better 
economy than the quasi-state, thus holding out a promise of a higher standard of 
living for the quasi-state population in case of reunification.  
 
The chances for negotiated federal settlements will improve should the international 
society decide to play a more active role in any of these conflicts, especially if the 
involvement is backed with credible threats of economic and/or military sanctions 
against non-compliant parties. The likelihood of this outcome will  increase further if 
the external patron is persuaded to drop or reduce its patronage of the quasi-state.  
 
Any settlement of any quasi-state conflict will have repercussions into the remaining 
unresolved cases. If a parent state manages to regain control over a lost territory with 
military means, this will obviously encourage other state leaders to try the same 
solution. Conversely, the granting of international recognition to one quasi-state, even 
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if presented as an 'exceptional case', will embolden other quasi-state leaders and make 
them even less amenable to compromise solutions than before.  
 
Below, these four possible scenarios will be discussed in the order in which they, in 
my judgment, represent probable outcomes to these conflicts.  
 
 INCLUSION INTO THE EXTERNAL PATRON STATE  
While political leaders in both Nagorno-Karabakh and Northern Cyprus, as well as in 
their respective patron states, aver that unification is not what they are aiming for, it 
seems reasonably clear that for these quasi-state leaders this represents the optimal 
solution. The inhabitants of Abkhazia and South Ossetia already enjoy a special visa 
regime with Russia not granted to citizens of their parent state, Georgia, and for 
political leaders in South Ossetia inclusion into the Russian Federation is obviously 
what they hope for. Certain groups also in the DMR are pushing for unification with 
Russia, even if this quasi-state does not have a common border with Russia. They 
point to the Kaliningrad oblast as a precedent for such exclave status, 5 but this 
argument is not likely to receive wide support, either in Russia or in the Western 
world. So far there are no examples of successful inclusion into the external patron 
state, unless we count Nagorno-Karabakh as such a case. The fact that even in 
Nagorno-Karabakh the de facto inclusion is not officially acknowledged is an 
indication of the weak support this solution enjoys internationally. The NKR will not 
have any demonstration effect on other cases. 
 
FULL INDEPENDENCE 
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Full independence and international recognition clearly remain the ultimate goal for 
most secessionist groups. However, in the post-World War II period, the unwritten 
rules of international relations have contained extremely strong restrictions against the 
creation of new states (Österud, 1997). While the principle of the self-determination 
of peoples is enshrined in the UN Charter, this right is interpreted as pertaining to the 
entire population of a state only, not to any of its territorial or cultural subgroups. It 
gives the citizens a right to elect their own state leaders, but not to opt out of the state 
altogether. The community of recognized states has thus in principle been closed on 
both ends. While no members are thrown out, the entrance gate has been strictly 
guarded and new applicants are routinely turned away.  
 
To be sure, this restrictive policy has not prevented a veritable explosion of the 
membership of the United Nations—from the original fifty-one signatory states to its 
present 191 members. Most of the new entrants were admitted in one of two periods: 
Between the mid-1950s and mid-1960s a host of former colonies in Africa and Asia 
were granted membership in the UN, and in the 1990s the same happened to former 
republics of the three dissolved communist federations in Europe and Central Asia.  
 
All fifteen republics in the USSR had a constitutional right to secede, and in 1991 the 
Soviet republics were only exercising a right granted to them by the communist 
leaders themselves, it was argued. In addition, the dissolution was basically peaceful: 
even if the Soviet leadership under Mikhail Gorbachev opposed state dissolution,  the 
Soviet republics granted each other mutual recognition.  In the Yugoslav case the 
argument was slightly different. In the summer of 1992 the Badinter Arbitration 
Commission presented a report that concluded that the Yugoslav state was already 'in 
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the process of dissolution’ (Welhengama, 2000, p. 250). This view was accepted by 
the EU and the UN, and on that basis the former Yugoslav republics were recognized 
one by one. 
 
Today’s quasi-state leaders draw parallels to both these periods of state creation in 
order to justify their cause. Depending on the circumstances, they present their 
independence struggle as one of decolonization and/or decommunization (See 
'Chechens Appeal’, 2001, and Nagorno Karabagh, 1997). Like the former Soviet 
republics that today are independent states, most current quasi-states in post-Soviet 
Eurasia were also formerly federal units of the Soviet Union, but on a lower level. 
The IC, however, has refused to accept status as a former autonomous unit on a lower 
level in the Soviet or the Yugoslav state as legitimate ground for independent 
statehood. 
  
Aspiring state leaders also in other parts of the world are pointing to preexisting 
administrative or political borders to support claims to independent statehood. 
Somaliland has tried to persuade the world that it has the right to secede from 
Somalia, since it had been a separate British colony before 1960, and even enjoyed a 
brief moment—five days— of separate statehood before the two former colonies 
Somaliland and Somalia united (Pegg, 1998, 87). Arguments of this kind, however, 
are unlikely to carry the day.  
  
If international recognition is extended to any of the world's current quasi-states this 
will not automatically turn them into functioning, ‘normal’ states. As pointed out 
above, many quasi-states have an economy and institutional structures that strongly 
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resemble Jacksonian quasi-states or failed states. There is every reason to believe that 
if these states are granted international recognition simply as a reward for 
perseverance in the liberation struggle, or in sympathy with their sufferings at the 
hands of the challenger state, many of them will end up not as functioning or strong 
states, but instead as failed states or even ‘shadow states’. Unless recognition is 
followed up by massive financial support and strict monitoring for an extended period 
of time, they may all too easily come to repeat the unfortunate experience of former 
European colonies in Africa.  
 
REABSORPTION INTO THE PARENT STATE 
Reabsorption happened to Katanga in 1965, Biafra in 1970, and Krajina in 1995. In 
the latter case, the Tudjman regime had quietly built up a strong army with offensive 
capacities and launched a surprise attack, Operation Storm. Western criticism of this 
operation was remarkably muted, in spite of the fact that it produced a fear-induced 
mass exodus of the local Serb population, similar in many ways to the flight of 
Palestinians from Israeli-controlled regions of Palestine in 1948. The subdued 
reaction to Operation Storm may encourage other parent states to attempt a military 
solution to their secession problem when they feel they are strong enough.  
 
This suggests that two factors in particular will influence the likelihood of this 
scenario: the economic and political strength of the parent state and the reaction of the 
outside world. Should a parent state achieve both state consolidation and support from 
strong international actors they may attempt this outcome.  
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INCLUSION INTO THE PARENT STATE AS A SEPARATE ENTITY IN A 
FEDERATED OR CONFEDERATE ARRANGEMENT  
A parent state that  has used force to reabsorb a quasi-state may still accept a 
federated or confederate arrangement for the recovered territory. Having been 
(incompletely)  reincorporated into the Russian state, Chechnia today enjoys the same 
republican status as other ethnically defined republics in the country, with the same 
formal rights and prerogatives under  the Russian constitution.6  
 
When reunification is the result of negotiated peaceful settlements a federal solution is  
an even more probable outcome. In negotiations between a parent state and a 
breakaway region this solution is often, in principle, accepted by both parties, but 
many observers suspect that one or both parties are only pretending to accept a federal 
arrangement. In the cases of DMR, Abkhazia, and Northern Cyprus, the breakaway 
regions have been accused of feigning support for a special-status-in-a-common-state 
solution as a smokescreen to create the false impression that they are engaged in real 
negotiations. While the separatist leaders regard the current unrecognized status of 
their state as inferior to full independence they see it as clearly preferable to a status 
as only an autonomous unit within another state. As Charles King has rhetorically 
asked, 'why be mayor of a small city if you can be president of a country? Why be 
lieutenant in somebody else's army if you can be a general in your own?' (King, 2001, 
55).   
 
Powerful criminal and black market elements in the quasi-state who benefit from the 
status quo actively obstruct negotiations from behind the scenes. It is therefore 
unlikely that movement in the direction of a negotiated federal solution will come 
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from the quasi-state leaders. An impetus towards this outcome must come from the 
international community.  Moreover, pressure must be put not only on the local 
parties but  also on the external patron state.  
 
In one instance in recent years the IC has dramatically stepped up its involvement in 
the efforts to resolve a quasi-state conflict. In the fall of 2003, the UN with direct 
involvement of its General Secretary Kofi Annan took an initiative for a voluntary 
unification between TRNC and the Greek-dominated part of the island. The Annan 
plan was linked to the EU enlargement process: a window of opportunity had opened 
up, it was hoped, as both Cyprus and Turkey eagerly wanted to join the European 
Union. Turkey reacted by forcing its client state TRNC into a more conciliatory 
position, but the plan nevertheless  foundered in spring 2004 when it was voted down 
by the Greek Cypriots in a referendum. A serious problem with the plan was that it 
gave the Greek Cypriots a virtual veto right but few incentives to support it, since the 
Greek part of the island would be included into the EU even without reunification. 
The failure of the Annan plan was a major setback for international mediation in 
general and for UN involvement in particular and may discourage the IC from similar 
initiatives in the near future. Even so, it showed that external patron states, and 
through them also their client states, may be nudged towards compromise positions, 
given the right inducements.  
 
In another case from recent years Republika Srpska  was established as a separate 
‘entity’ of Bosnia-Herzegovina in the 1995 Dayton settlement as a result of active 
international engagement. In this case not the carrot but a huge stick—air bombing—
was used to force the secessionists into pliability. Indicatively, in this case the 
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solution was reached over the head of the secessionists themselves, by inviting only 
Slobodan Milosevic, the leader of the patron state, to the Dayton negotiations.   
 
The Bosnian solution can hardly be called a success story, as least not yet. The 
Republika Srpska leadership obstructs as much cooperation and contact with the other 
entity of the Bosnian state, the Muslim-Croat federation, as they dare. Still, there are 
signs of a gradual normalization  of the  relationship between the two parts of the 
country.7 
 
While the record is certainly mixed, a negotiated, federal settlement nevertheless is 
the solution that creates the lowest number of people who are so disgruntled that they 
will work actively to overturn it. In addition, the factors that militate against the 
alternative outcomes are clearly stronger. On balance, therefore, this compromise 
solution must be regarded as  the most likely end to  most unrecognized quasi-states. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
1 A Google search (May 2005) gave 120,000  hits for 'failed states' and only 6,200 for 
'quasi-states'.  
2 King uses also the terms 'de facto states' and 'quasi-states' as synonymous with 
'unrecognized states’.  
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3 Vladimir Kolossov and John O’Loughlin's term pseudo states is less felicitious as 
this designation implies a value assessment. As pseudos means ‘a lie’ in Greek their 
term ‘pseudo states’ seems to suggest that these entities ought to be condemned and 
obliterated. Perhaps some of them should, but this is a normative issue that this article 
will not address. See Kolossov and O’Loughlin, 1999.  
4 Some are willing to concede that the population of the breakaway area represents a 
regional or ethnic subgroup but not a distinct and separate nation.  
5 Author's interviews with DMR parliament deputy speaker Anna Volkova, and  DMR 
'foreign minister' Valery Litskai, in Tiraspol,  in  May 1992 and  May 1995. 
6 In practice these rights have often been violated, for instance through centrally 
orchestrated fraudulent elections.  
7 Autor's interviews in Sarajevo and Banja Luka, May 2002 and November 2003. 
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